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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis discusses the strategic and ensuing management
control systems implemented by Commander-in-Chief United
States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)1 during the United States
forces withdrawal from the United States Naval Complex at
Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines. Specifically, it
addresses a major and unforeseen evolution which developed
during the base closure process and partially executed
withdrawal plan: the Government of the Philippine's
unexpected request for a "hot turnover" 2 of Naval Air Station
(NAS) Cubi Point.
This chapter provides an overview of the base closing
scenario and describes the perspective from which the case is
written. The second chapter provides a teaching note as an
aid to the instructor in facilitating the case study in a
classroom environment. The third and final chapter provides
the management case study complimentary to a previous case
study entitled: "U.S. Naval Complex at Subic Bay", by LT Larry
J. Steckler, January 1992. While the former case provides an
overall "vision" of the entire withdrawal evolution as seen
1CINCPACFLT, a U.S. Navy headquarters staff command, was
the executive agent for the withdrawal and closure of the
Naval complex at Subic Bay.
2
"Hot turnover" is a phrase used in this context to
denote a "completely operational" airfield, with all necessary
equipment intact and functioning properly.
1
through the eyes of CINCPACFLT staff, this case focuses on the
withdrawal process in a narrower perspective, specifically the
"hot turnover" issue.
This case is written from the perspective of Captain Gary
Ikuma, the Fleet Aviation Material Readiness Officer at
CINCPACFLT headquarters. CAPT Ikuma was the "technical
expert" who played a major role in coordinating the withdrawal
from and ultimately the "hot turnover" of NAS Cubi Point. It
is through CAPT Ikuma's eyes that the reader can fully sense
the frustration and anxiety evolving from this time-critical
and highly political situation, and can fully realize the
management control systems effected by CINCPACFLT and
Commander, United States Naval Forces Philippines
(COMUSNAVPHIL) staffs to smoothly execute the "hot turnover"
of NAS Cubi Point.
For the United States Pacific Fleet, January 1992 proved
to be an extraordinary month which commenced an intensive 11-
month withdrawal process of the United States forces from the
Subic Bay Naval Complex. This massive withdrawal effort was
a result of the Philippine Senate rejection of the Foreign
Bases Treaty Agreement (see Appendix A for overview of events
leading up to the Subic Bay closure and United States forces
withdrawal). Included in this overall withdrawal plan from
Subic Bay Naval Station were facilities and personnel located
at NAS Cubi Point. This case study sets the scenario for all
the events leading up to and finalizing with the "hot
2
turnover," providing discussion on the strategy and ensuing
management control systems developed when the concept of "hot
turnover" became reality.
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II. NAS CUBI POINT: A "NOT TURNOVERO?
A MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY
Captain (CAPT) Gary Ikuma, the Fleet Aviation Material
Readiness Officer at Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT) 3 headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
smiled as he reflected contentedly over the sequence of events
played out over the past 11 months. The day was 24 November
1992, marking the climactic finale of the successful "Hot
Turnover"4 of Naval Air Station Cubi Point to the Government
of the Philippines, as the last of United States forces
withdrew from the United States Naval Base at Subic Bay,
Republic of the Philippines. (Appendix A is an overview of
the terminated 1988 Military Bases Agreement and events
leading up to the Subic Bay closure and United States forces
withdrawal.)
CAPT Ikuma realized that certain highlights would be
forever implanted in his memory, such as the Philippine
government's "equipment" request for dogs and horses and a
leroy lettering set... or the prospect of Admiral (ADM) Robert
3 CINCPACFLT, a U.S. Navy headquarters staff command, was
the executive agent for the withdrawal and closure of the
Naval complex at Subic Bay; while CINCPACFLT was also the
title for ADM Kelly, it is used in the case study to refer to
the headquarters staff only and not ADM Kelly.
4"Hot Turnover" is a phrase used in this context to
denote a "completely operational" airfield, with all necessary
equipment intact and functioning properly.
4
J. Kelly, Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet,
trying to disembark his plane during the closing ceremonial
visit without the Philippine government's foresight to keep
the stairtruck5 as a "required" item.
As he sat in his office reminiscing, CAPT Ikuma drew out
his pen and began to tackle his next objective: outline a
"lessons learned" packet to brief ADM Kelly. CAPT Ikuma thus
pondered over what could he have done differently. What
management controls were successfully executed? What could be
improved upon to provide a more fluid turnover for future base
closures? Deep in thought and pen poised, CAPT Ikuma recalled
the entire evolution.
THE BASE
Naval Air Station (NAS) Cubi Point was located at the
Subic Bay Naval complex, on the west coast of Luzon Island,
Republic of the Philippines. Subic Bay is situated in the
Zambales Province of Luzon Island, 80 kilometers west by
northwest of Manila, and is separated from that city by both
Manila Bay and the Bataan Peninsula. NAS Cubi Point comprised
one of six major activities located within the United States
Naval Facility Subic Bay. (NAS Cubi Point Equipment
Transition Plan, 1992, p. II-i) (Its location is shown in
Exhibits 1 and 2.)
5Stairtruck: a mobile ladder designed to enable personnel
to disembark an aircraft.
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THE EVOLUTION BEGINS
One of the largest withdrawal issues addressed between the
United States and Philippine governments, was the "hot
turnover" of NAS Cubi Point in an operational, Instrument
Flight Rules status to the Government of the Philippines
(GOP). CAPT Ikuma recalled the week in early February when
the "hot turnover" issue emerged in the midst of the partially
executed United States forces withdrawal plan. Two months
after the withdrawal directive was issued in January, GOP
officials expressed an interest in receiving NAS Cubi Point as
an "operational" airfield. Consequently, Admiral Kelly tasked
CAPT Ikuma in February to oversee the "hot turnover" and "make
it happen."
POLITICAL TURMOIL
CAPT Ikuma, informally dubbed CINCPACFLT's "Mr. Cubi
Point" because of his specific expertise on air traffic
control, airfield operations and maintenance efforts at Cubi
Point, worked closely with Rear Admiral (RADM) Thomas Mercer,
Commander, United States Naval Forces Philippines
(COMUSNAVPHIL) and his staff because of the difficult
political situation in the Philippines. Political disarray
was a major concern even before the Foreign Bases Treaty
Agreement had been rejected by the Philippine Senate in
December 1991. RADM Mercer, as the base commander was a key
on-scene player during the entire base closing process and
described the political situation as such:
6
The Filipinos couldn't have picked a worse time
"politically" to ask the United States military to leave
the country. The Philippines was conducting its first
free and open election since 1965 and virtually every
elective office in the country was up for re-election.
The result was a government paralyzed at a time when
important decisions were required to coordinate with the
United States Navy the transition and conversion of the
giant Subic Naval complex. Adding to the political turmoil
were the tremendous political pressures brought to bear on
President Aquino by the political power barons in Manila,
who despised and feared the young, charismatic Richard
Gordon, Mayor of Olongapo, and initially blocked his
Presidential appointment to the Chairmanship. Valuable
time for planning for the transition and conversion of
Subic, not to mention equipment and material that might
have been "diplomatically left in place" had there been
consensus on the Filipino side, was needlessly squandered.
(Mercer, 1993a, pp. 18-19)
RADM Mercer recalled that the disarray of the GOP had
actually been a characteristic common to the previous 1991
closure of Clark Air Force Base, also in the Philippines.
However, the United States Air Force had been able to
neutralize problems created by the political disarray and
uncertainty by telling the Philippine government they intended
to turn Clark over to Philippine Air Force officials and
proceeded with this approach despite the protestations of
government officials in Manila. RADM Mercer elaborated:
Their selection of a "single point of contact" worked well
for the U.S. Air Force, but jeopardized the goodwill of
the Aquino Administration when the U.S. Navy began the
process to close Subic. Still chafing from the Clark
turnover, Manila informed the U.S. Embassy the U.S. Navy
would deal with officials identified by President Aquino
and no others. Her ineptness at appointing a coalition
government spokesperson set off a power struggle within
the Philippine political system that lost valuable time
for the Philippine government to get a transition plan in
place. (Mercer, 1993a, p. 12)
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THE NTROIKAN POWER STRUGGLE
CAPT Ikuma coped with the power struggle to which RADM
Mercer referred. Sifting through the deluge of message
traffic on the subject, he found that the Philippine players
competing for control of the conversion of Subic Bay
(including NAS Cubi Point,) were Olongapo Mayor Richard
Gordon, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff
General Lisandro Abadia, and newly appointed Bases Conversion
Task Force Director Alejandro Melchor. In March, President
Aquino finally took action by creating a law establishing the
conversion of former United States bases in the Philippines to
commercial use. The Bases Conversion Development Authority,
headed by Mr. Melchor, would have broad powers for the
conversion process. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,
headed by Mayor Gordon, would oversee the conversion of the
bases at Subic Bay, to be transformed into a free port. This
new port would be used to attempt to minimize government
regulations and oversight by relaxing customs/currency/visa
requirements. Tension developed between Melchor and Gordon,
as both organizations' leaders had opposing designs for the
facilities and equipment at Subic Bay.
Meanwhile, outside the GOP "Melchor-Gordon battlefield,"
AFP General Abadia had also staked a claim for use of Cubi
Point. CAPT Ikuma found the situation confusing and
unsettling as GOP leaders' wants and desires appeared to be
directionless with no one power in control of the GOP to
8
articulate their country's strategy or yet to be developed
plan.
To further complicate matters, each adversary sought the
support of the United States to enhance their position in the
political arena. Olongapo Mayor Gordon wanted NQ Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) present in Subic after the United
States departs. He was convinced that any military presence
would detract from the appeal of the facility to commercial
investors, thus aborting commercial development of the
facility.
Conversely, AFP General Abadia wanted NAS Cubi Point to
become a major AFP base; he clearly saw the potential gains
for the APP in establishing a major presence there. His
intent was to establish an air base wing commanded by a flag
officer at Cubi Point, with or without aircraft. He strongly
supported a $4.8 million US Foreign Military Sales 6 purchase
of aerodrome equipment, spares and training. Regardless of
whether the Philippine Air Force would be permitted to base
aircraft at Cubi Point after United States forces withdrawal,
General Abadia was committed to ensuring there be a major AFP
presence at that installation.
Mr. Melchor, who opposed Mayor Gordon's development
concept, backed the AFP yet clearly had different ideas than
6Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases were established to
enable the APP to purchase non-excess equipment using FMS
financial credits.
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the AFP about the eventual development of Subic. He
envisioned commercial development as a primary goal, putting
AFP use of Cubi Point as a "fall back" position with the
Philippine Air Force as a tenant of a primarily commercial
airfield. Additionally, Melchor strongly pushed for a delay
in the United States withdrawal process, allowing more time
for the commercialization and privatization of Subic.
Claiming such a delay would be possible under the Philippine
constitution, Melchor pushed for "special deals" between the
United States Navy and U.S. businessmen.
Clearly, the United States was caught in i-.. middle of
this "troika" power struggle to control the conversion of
Subic and disagreements over its ultimate status as a
civilian, military or joint airfield. There was a major
dilemma over with whom to coordinate, at least until the
presidential elections were over in August, while remaining
steadfast on the position of conducting the withdrawal on the
one-year timeline as previously agreed upon by the two
governments.
There was also the very real potential for Mayor Gordon to
be appointed as Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) chief
in the next administration. Gordon's adamant stance on
eliminating AFP presence in Subic would run counter to United
States legal requirements for a "military presence" when
transferring excess materi~l under Section 519 of the Foreign
Assistance Act. With this in mind, CAPT Ikuma needed to
10
acquaint himself with the myriad of logistic issues he would
soon encounter in the disposition and transfer of excess
material.
LOGISTICS
A meeting with the CINCPACFLT Logistics Program Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel (LCOL) Hudak, proved to be very
enlightening. LCOL Hudak, heavily involved in the logistical
planning for the withdrawal, provided CAPT Ikuma with insight
on managing the enormous logistics workload, perhaps the most
critical aspect of achieving a successful withdrawal on
schedule.
As soon as the withdrawal order was given, CINCPACFLT
staff members, traveled to Subic Bay to assist in the
development of a cargo identification and shipping plan
using the existing Time Phased Force Deployment Directive
(TPFDD) process. This TPFDD was managed, updated and
maintained by the "logistics planning cell" to ensure
continuous adherence to the established timeline for cargo
pickup, availability of transportation assets for
shipping, and excess property turn-in to the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO). Major
logistics concerns throughout the process included:
1. A mandate for absolute accountability of all U. S.
assets during the movement, packing, crating, shipping and
excessing. This requirement included the need for
enhanced security of pilferable assets during periods of
unprecedented upheaval.
2. Short and long term scheduling of surface and air
transportation for 450,000 tons of cargo, 10,000 personnel
and several hundred pets.
3. Identification, packaging and shipping of 1.5 million
pounds of hazardous wastes for proper disposal in the
Continental United States.
4. Timely disposal of all Excess Defense Articles in
accordance with United States laws, treaties and foreign
agreements to include 519 material turnover to the Armed
11
Forces of the Philippines and sales to the Philippine
Government. (CINCPACFLT, 1993, p. 10)
Zxcess Defense Articles
The disposition of United States Excess Defense Articles
(EDA) at Cubi Point was paramount to the negotiations
conducted between the United States and the GOP. First and
foremost, ADM Kelly needed to agree with GOP politicos on what
was defined as removable or non-removable. Obviously,
buildings and infrastructure, such as the runway, were defined
as non-removable; but there were also many entities such as
radar towers and the bowling alley that were a source of
contention. Once these issues were ironed out, ADM Kelly next
had to decide on the removable property which was actually
essential or cost effective to remove. The one-year time
limit to complete the withdrawal compounded by the additional
limitations of Department of Defense funding and available
transportation, all served to impact the decisions made on
what the United States would ship from the Philippines and
what would remain. Once decisions were made on the removable
property to be shipped, proper disposition of all remaining
property needed to be accomplished.
In April, CAPT Ikuma arranged a meeting with Commander
(CDR) Luzynski, the CINCPACFLT subject expert on Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), to get briefed on the status of the
disposition of United States property.
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The removable property determined to be in excess of
United States Navy or DOD needs was turned over to Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO), the disposal agent
for all removable property not being shipped; the disposal
sequence was prioritized as follows:
1. Reutilization by DOD customers.
2. Transfer to United States federal agencies for use
outside the Philippines.
3. Transfer to United States federal agencies for use
within the Philippines. (Ikuma, 1993)
If none of the above agencies claimed the EDA turned into
DRMO, the excess property would then be disposed of in two
ways. First, EDA was offered for transfer to the AFP under
Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which permitted the
free transfer of excess non-lethal defense articles to the
armed forces of friendly foreign governments to help modernize
their defense capabilities.
The second method to dispose of excess material was its
sale to the GOP under wRight of First Option to Acquire.* As
defined in the Schultz/Manglapus 1988 Memorandum Of Agreement
on United States military facilities in the Philippines, any
excess removable property turned down by the AFP was
subsequently offered to the Philippine government at a greatly
reduced cost prior to its sale in the Philippines to the
general public.
CDR Luzynski briefed CAPT Ikuma on the sequence of events
thus far:
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In early April, the United States State Department, citing
a longstanding relationship with the Philippines as
codified by the Mutual Defense Treaty, instructed the
American Embassy in Manila to be as forthcoming as
possible with respect to transfer of articles under
Section 519 to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Later on that same month, the American embassy delivered
a diplomatic notice advising GOP officials of rights to
obtain outright title to excess equipment valued at
approximately $34 Million US for $4.1 Million US or to
permit the AFP to acquire the material for use under
Section 519. Material not selected by the AFP would then
be offered for sale to the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority. (Steckler, L., 1992, pp. 15-16)
Capt Ikuma reviewed the diplomatic note sent via the
American Embassy in Manila, as approved by the Secretary of
State, Washington D.C., to the Philippine government. The note
informed the GOP that the United States government would turn
over a list of excess military property available for
disposition in the Philippines prior to 1 May and emphasized
that GOP officials exercise their "Right of First Option to
Acquire" this property in as expeditious a manner as possible.
Any other Philippine government recipients may then be
eligible to purchase such items of the excess property which
are appropriate for sale for non-military use to civilian
governmental entities at costs calculated under U.S.
guidelines. The AFP is the only element of the Philippine
acovernment to which excess defense articles may be transferred
at no cost. (Ikuma, 1993)
As CAPT Ikuma pondered over the GOP's response to the EDA
legal provisions required in the "hot turnover" process, it
became apparent that Mayor Gordon wanted "everything for
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nothing". After all, why should they have to "buy" United
States excess material, even if at a reduced cost when the AFP
could get the material transferred free of charge through
Section 519. CAPT Ikuma realized there existed the
possibility that the AFP could actually get the material for
free and then turn it over to the GOP after the 24th. How
would or could ADM Kelly protect CINCPACFLT assets from this
type of deception?
Another point of dismay from ADM Kelly' s perspective dealt
with the disposal of non-excess material. The United States
Navy was not getting reimbursed for the non-excess material it
sold to the GOP through the FMS Program. All of this came
"out of pocket" for the United States Navy since it was
CINCPACFLT property. The FMS property sold to the GOP at a
reduced cost was n= excess to CINCPACFLT's needs, and
consequently CINCPACFLT was forced to turn around and replace
this equipment at the higher wholesale cost to restock their
inventory.
As negotiations on the disposition of Excess Defense
Articles continued between representatives of CINCPACFLT,
COMUSNAVPHIL, the American Embassy Manila and the GOP,
Congress was influencing the turnover procesa by exercising
its oversight powers. Members of Congress couldn't understand
why the GOP was getting priority for United States property
obtained via United States taxpayer dollars, as Congressional
constituents had other uses for much of the excess material at
15
Subic Bay. CINCPACFLT was tasked with researching answers to
these concerns, a setback which could delay the timetable for
turnover. CAPT Ikuma perused the memo from Vanessa D. Allen,
Congressional Relations for the Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSAA), to General Allen, Director DSAA, dated 29 May
1992:
... Congressional concerns center on two broad themes:
(1) general disillusionment with the Philippines due to
the loss of U.S. base right and earlier incidents of
looting by Filipinos (after the closure of Clark Air Force
Base] and (2) Congressional sentiments that States ought
to have a higher priority in receiving EDA than foreign
governments.
Many members believe that items previously
transferred as EDA have fallen into the hands of looters.
Therefore, the HASC (House Armed Services Committee] is
proposing that DOD provide certification to Congress that
items in this notification have actually been received by
the Philippine government and audited accordingly. DSAA
should receive a letter requesting this certification on
Monday, 1 June. This letter may avert an attempt to put
this notification on "hold."
As you know, Rep Kanjorski plans to submit an
amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill (General
debate may begin Tuesday) which would give the States a
higher priority for receiving certain excess items and
force DOD to pay for transporting those items to the
States. Because this notification shows items such as
hardware items, trucks, vans, trailers, forklifts, etc.,
some members are using this as an example of a case in
which States should have priority over foreign
governments.
The staff had several detailed questions on EDA
valuation procedures which I will pass to the Navy
Congressional Liaison office. I will keep you informed
as this issue develops. (Allen, 1992)
CAPT Ikuma reviewed the withdrawal timetable, fully aware
that holding up the Article 519 transfer authorization for
Congress to deliberate could very well jeopardize the transfer
of EDA to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and ultimately
16
risk abandonment of the material. If CINCPACFLT held the
material for 30-days pending a more extensive Congressional
review, and the 519 EDA transfer was subsequently disapproved,
CINCPACFLT would have to process the material for sale through
DRMO; however, because the withdrawal timetable required DRMO
sales to resume no later than 1 June and the 30-day
Congressional delay would push them into July, it was unlikely
that CINCPACFLT could even process the material for sale
through DRMO.
SPECIFICITY AN ISSUE
Compounding the state of confusion over legal
ramifications, GOP politicos' desires, U.S. Navy requirements,
and Congress' whims was that the GOP leaders had still not
identified the specific equipment they desired (e.g.,
Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS), radars, support equipment), nor
had training requirements been made known. In its state of
political turmoil and dissention between Mayor Gordon and AFP
General Abadia over the ultimate status of the airfield,
little or no direction was given in implementing GOP desires.
GOP/AFP leaders provided little information to plan the
equipment transfers, relying on United States Navy staff
officers to define plan requirements. In fact, the entire "hot
turnover" issue was driven primarily not by GOP officials but
by the American Embassy staff, based on their apparent belief
that the "hot turnover" would establish a better post
withdrawal relationship with the Philippine government.
17
TINE FOR ACTION
Understandably, CAPT Ikuma found the current situation
extremely frustrating as GOP leaders not only had trouble
communicating among themselves, but they were equally lax in
expressing their intentions and desires to United States
government officials. The GOP's lack of specificity was an
ongoing concern to CAPT Ikuma, an indication that GOP
officials were obviously confused on what equipment was
essential to maintain Cubi Point in an operational capacity.
CAPT Ikuma calculated the milestone date for identifying
any hot turnover requirements to be 1 June 1992. After that
date, major equipment for airfield operations would begin to
be shipped out in accordance with the Time Phased Force
Deployment Database (TPFDD). Furthermore, the bulk of
Permanent Change of Station moves of airfield operations and
support personnel would also be executed by I June. This
would directly impact the ability to train Filipinos on the
operation and maintenance of equipment left behind to support
the airfield. Most air traffic control equipment would be
disassembled, packed, and shipped after 1 October 1992.
Delayed decisions on any "hot turnover" issues which took
place after 1 June, would result in less equipment and




CAPT Ikuma realized the potential hazards of any delay to
the turnover schedule and effected some management controls to
stimulate the process. Realizing the misdirection and lack of
communication within the Philippine military and political
structures, CAPT Ikuma drafted three sets of proposals to
guide GOP officials in their efforts to formulate a decision
on what U.S. Navy equipment they should purchase with FMS
dollars. The proposals ranged from a full-blown operational
airfield as it existed prior to any withdrawal efforts, to a
bare minimum IFR airfield. In early March, CAPT Ikuma
presented his options in a brief to ADM Kelly, while
informally predicting the final outcome: GOP officials would
opt for the bare minimum IFR airfield.
More specifically, the options were as follows:
A. FULL IFR CAPABILITY. Essentially the current status:
radars, NAVAIDS, communication, weather, maintenance/support
equipment.
B. REDUCED IFR CAPABILITY. Approach radar. NAVAIDS,
communication, weather/Precision Approach Radar (PAR).
C. BASIC IFR CAPABILITY. Tactical Aid to Navigation
(TACAN), Non-Directional Beacon (NDB), communication, weather
7
"Warm turnover" was a new phrase coined by the staff of
the American Embassy Manila after the GOP opted for the basic
IFR airfield and its usefulness as a "fully operational"
airfield became questionable.
19
measuring equipment, limited airfield operations/maintenance
equipment. No radars. (Ikuma, 1992a, p. 2)
It was obvious to CAPT Ikuma that the GOP politicos did
not know what they wanted or needed to maintain Cubi Point in
an operational status. Mayor Gordon and General Abadia could
not even agree between themselves whether it was to be used
for military or commercial purposes, or even jointly. At this
early stage, the GOP leaders only knew they wanted Cubi Point
turned over in an operational capacity, and wanted to get by
with paying the least amount of dollars. As an example of
their confusion, when asked to put forth a list of what they
wanted, the GOP lists contained numerous items unrelated to
the airfield such as bulldozers, jack hammers... and even dogs
and horses! The GOP suggestion list was quickly disregarded
and CAPT Ikuma's "three-phased" version came into play.
It was at this point that CAPT Ikuma questioned the
definition of "operational," for the airfield the GOP desired
was certainly not operational by United States standards.
Thus, the term "warm turnover" was introduced.
AFFORDABILITY AN ISSUE
July brought some new revelations. It had become quite
clear to all involved that while purchasing airfield equipment
at Cubi Point was certainly desirable for the GOP, long-run
affordability was not as clear. GOP officials were voicing
second thoughts on the viability of a "hot" (or even "warm")
turnover. In conversation with RADM Mercer, Philippine
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Secretary of Defense DeVilla indicated that future operability
of the airfield required funds that were in competition with
higher priorities in the AFP's modernization plan. 8 Even if
FMS levels supported the purchase of airfield equipment,
should GOP politicos decide they could not afford future
operations at Cubi Point, the "hot turnover" could become a
non-issue, thus aborting the entire plan... a very real
contingency United States officials needed to plan for.
Still persuing the "hot turnover" concept, USCINCPAC and
AFP staffs devised plans that outlined the costs involved.
The USCINCPAC Plan, based on CAPT Ikuma's three options, was
condensed to the basic IFR airfield with no radars and had a
price tag of $4.9 million US. The AFP Plan included all the
equipment in the USCINCPAC Plan plus two major additions: the
ASR-8 radar ($7.9 million US) and the Precision Approach
Radar 9  ($5.1 million US). (See Appendix B for
discussion/comparison of radars).
GOP leaders eventually came to terms with the fact that
they simply did not have enough money for an FMS purchase of
$15 million US, the recommended FMS sale to include the ASR
radar which they desperately wanted. Even so, the merits of
8Following his 30 June inauguration, President Ramos
promised to modernize the Philippine Air Force and air defense
capability by the end of his six year term.
9The PAR was deleted from the AFP Plan by U.S. officials
as "Not for Sale" based on it required intensive training and
consequently a safety concern if not properly maintained and
operated by the AFP.
21
a radar environment made it worthy of very serious
consideration, since this would keep future access for the
United States a viable option. Without a radar system, Cubi
airfield would be essentially reduced to daylight and
fairweather visual flying rules operations only; given the
mountainous terrain in the Cubi vicinity, potential future use
by United States aircraft would be minimized since safety
would be a major concern.
In an attempt to reduce costs of obtaining airfield
equipment, AFP General Abadia nonetheless considered dropping
the ASR radar from the package and substituting an alternative
radar, the Instrument Landing System (ILS) (see Appendix B).
The ILS is used by the United States Air Force and commercial
aircraft. Since the Navy did not have ILS at Cubi Point and
therefore could not provide it under the 519 Program, the AF-
would possibly procure it through United States aid or
commercially.
NOT THERE YET
The withdrawal was well into July, yet the "hot turnover"
continued to encounter snags. The crucial issue addressed was
training and the fate of the airfield once turned over to the
GOP. It was quite evident that Philippine Air Force (PAF)
personnel were not yet qualified nor ready to operate the
airfield equipment. The unavailability of trained personnel
to run an operational airfield after turnover could jeopardize
the "hot turnover" plan, making all efforts by both countries
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for naught; the United States might just as well have closed
the base down.
CAPT Ikuma recalled earlier message traffic that reflected
sentiments by Ambassador Frank Wisner, the American Ambassador
to the Philippines, that a "hot turnover" with AFP presence at
Cubi Point would allow the AFP to keep control of the Cubi
training areas. Should the United States decide in the future
to request access to the Philippines for transit and training,
the existence of an adequately equipped airport with an
inherent military influence at Cubi would enhance the chances
of success. (Ikuma, 1993) ADM Larson, United States
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific (ITSCINCPAC), as senior
military officer in charge of the Pacific Region, supported
this initiative in a meeting with President Aquino in May when
he described the Cubi Air Station as "the centerpiece of the
future cooperative arrangements between the United States and
the Philippines." (Ikuma, 1993) (See Exhibit 3 for
organization chart.)
Until a formal decision was made by the newly confirmed
GOP representative, Mayor Gordon, to proceed with a "hot
turnover" and specifying exactly what equipment the GOP would
purchase, the required training was put on hold. Up until
this point, all discussions of a "hot turnover" had been
informally negotiated with no formal request submitted by
Mayor Gordon. Inherent in this situation was a catch-22:
Technically, according to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) rules,
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no training could be provided until an FMS case was developed
and approved (i.e., FMS work needed to be charged to an FMS
account). While time was being expended to develop the FMS
case, pending a formal request by Mayor Gordon, the bulk of
United States enlisted and civilian personnel (those people
with the expertise at Cubi Point who would conduct the
training), were being transferred out. Additionally, the
Filipinos on-base who had the expertise to operate various
facilities were disappearing as these individuals were being
laid off. Valuable time and resources were slipping away.
At the end of July a Program Definition Conference was
held at NAS Cubi Point in response to these concerns. Headed
by CAPT Wayne Moni, Naval Air Systems Command FMS, CAPT Bruce
Wood, Commanding Officer of NAS Cubi Point and General
Estrellado of the Philippine Air Force, implementers from both
countries discussed requirements to support the "hot
turnover." The objectives of the Program Definition
Conference were:
a. Finalize equipment to be sold to the PAF via an
FMS case. This involved reviewing the initial
equipment list, verifying the essentiality of each
item and the necessary identifying information, and
determining if any additional items should be added.
b. Determine the proper selling price for each item
consistent with prevailing FMS rules and guidelines.
c. Compute the initial spare parts list required for
support of the equipment being sold under FMS.
d. Identify training required to enable PAF personnel
to operate the air station.
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e. Determine the extent of technical assistance and
its duration necessary to ensure a smooth transition.
(NAS Cubi Point Equipment Transition Plan, 1992,
p. III-l)
The ensuing Equipment Transition Plan from the conference
identified a program consisting of six FMS cases involving
equipment (e.g., air traffic control, emergency vehicles,
aircraft handling equipment), initial spare parts, training,
replenishment spare parts, technical assistance and repair
services. The plan also outlined an ambitious timeline to
establish transfer of the material through the FMS cases.
Completion was scheduled for 15 September 1992, providing
sufficient time for the United States Navy to dismantle and
remove any items the PAF chose not to buy.
A Program Definition Conference Training Group was
established to develop a program to sufficiently train PAF
personnel on equipment operation and maintenance procedures.
The training addressed equipment to be sold through an FMS
case, as well as equipment to be transferred via Section 519
of the Foreign Assistance Act.
The training group prepared formal training requirements
for all the preliminary equipment and Section 519 list items.
Discussions were held with PAF counterparts on prior
schooling, skill levels and qualifications of PAF technicians
scheduled for assignment to NAS Cubi Point. Skill levels of
PAF personnel had to be determined before a reasonable
assessment could be made by United States Navy planners as to
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the extent of training which could be completed given the
diminishing availability of United States personnel to conduct
the training prior to turnover.
Training requirements were divided among five basic
equipment categories: Air Traffic control, Emergency
Equipment, Operational Equipment, Auxiliary Equipment and Air
Freight Equipment. Should students require Special English
Terminology and Navy school training in addition to the
Tactical Aid to Navigation course, their training curriculum
could take approximately 45 weeks to complete. If the
students had an acceptable command of the English language and
did not require the Navy school, the curriculum shrank to five
weeks in duration.
CAPT Ikuma was reassured with the one advantage he saw the
GOP had in its favor: PAF air traffic controllers were
already trained and certified to Philippine Air Traffic Office
(PATO) standards, and as a group should easily fit inside
training and withdrawal constraints. These PAF personnel
should only require informal On-the-Job-Training to be
familiarized with the NAS Cubi Point tower equipment and local
operating procedures.
The jointly developed training program was signed by
General Abadia and RADM Mercer, as a component of the
Equipment Transition Plan developed at the Program Definition
Conference. The training program incorporated three major
26
areas: On-the-Job-Training (OJT), formal classroom training
and Mobile Training Team (MTT) assistance.
a. =JT. Involved training conducted on equipment at NAS
Cubi Point prior to turnover by Navy personnel already
operating the equipment; Navy instructors or contractors would
conduct the OJT program after turnover.
b. Formal Classroom Training. Provided the prerequisite
training necessary for operating and maintaining the
equipment. Classroom training would be accomplished in the
United States. Experience, education, English language
training, and "background" specialty training were all factors
taken into account in developing the curriculum.
c. Mobile Training Team (MTT). The MTT was a group of
qualified instructors dispatched to the FMS customer's
operational or training site for purposes of providing in-
country classroom and field training. Training was
interactive and usually performed with the customer's
equipment. (NAS Cubi Point Equipment Transition Plan, 1992,
p. VI-I)
All along ADM Kelly had been emphasizing the significance
of 1 June being the "milestone date" for GOP officials to
formalize their intentions. The intent had been to send PAF
personnel to the United States' Navy school in Memphis,
Tennessee for up to four months schooling. June had already
come and gone, and it was July before a training plan had been
initiated at the Program Definition Conference. Planning was
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in full motion, yet implementation was at a standstill. Mayor
Gordon still needed to decide what equipment to purchase, a
requisite to formalize the "hot turnover" request and get the
training
program rolling. A very real consequence could be a hurried
OJT effort and ultimately no "hot turnover" after all; the
"warm turnover" concept again surfaced with the real
possibility of not adequately training PAF personnel to
effectively operate the airfield.
LETTER OF INTENT
In early August, shortly after the Program Definition
Conference, Mayor Gordon finally submitted the long-awaited
request to procure equipment, spare parts and training from
the United States Navy, and to assume operation of the
airfield at Cubi Point. General Abadia and RADM Mercer signed
a non-binding Letter of Intent for the AFP to purchase
approximately $4.8 million US of equipment: this included
equipment ($2.5 million US) and spare parts and training ($2.3
million US). The ASR-8 surveillance radar, which would have
added $8-10 million US to the purchase price, was not included
in the package.
The decision to prioritize purchases and not buy the radar
underscored General Abadia's realization of just how limited
his financial resources had become. Fiscal priorities in
support of President Ramos' "modernization plan" drove Mayor
Gordon's decision to opt for the bare minimum "basic IFR
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capable" airfield, regardless of future safety considerations
and its impact on possible renewed access by the United
States.
The deletion of the ASR-8 from the FMS list, as well as
any equipment not compatible with supporting basic operations,
was driven by fiscal priority. Ironically, the passenger
stair truck was also deleted, which later had "interesting"
implications when, in preparation for the ADM Kelly's visit to
Cubi Point for turnover ceremonies, makeshift stairs had to be
constructed for the Admiral to disembark his plane!
LEGAL MMS ISSUES PERSIST
On 15 September, Commodore Delgado of the AFP Joint Staff,
signed the Letter of Offer and Acceptance to purchase the
various Cubi Point equipment as itemized in the Letter of
Intent. RADM Mercer was concerned that the sales/purchases
might be illegal, since Mayor Gordon intended minimal (or no)
AFP presence at Subic/Cubi. AFP presence was a crucial issue,
since without it the FMS sales could not legally take place.
Terms of the FMS case required the "purchaser" (i.e., the AFP)
to retain t and possession of the equipment; however, due
to Mayor Gordon's political power, RADM Mercer feared the GOP
would ultimately take possession of the FMS equipment, thereby
invalidating the contract.
The controversial FMS sale of $4.8 million US of non-
excess airfield equipment, spares and training spilled into
October. Even up until these last months, GOP, AFP and PAF
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leaders were in major disagreement on the amount of Philippine
military presence at Cubi Point. Mayor Gordon's joint civil-
military use plan called for minimal presence of the 15th
Strike Wing personnel at Cubi Point, while AFP General Abadia
demanded a dominant strike wing presence. Concurrent with
this disagreement, General Estrellado of the Philippine Air
Force insisted the strike wing not move to Cubi unless minimum
quality of life issues were met for PAF personnel.
The FMS cases would be canceled and the "hot turnover"
would ultimately not take place unless the FMS cases were
settled in favor of Philippine military presence. ADM Kelly
was prepared to remove all non-excess equipment should this
contingency transpire.
Mayor Gordon's assurance to comply with the purchase of
airfield equipment needed to be finalized by 1 November in
order that CAPT Ikuma have some leeway to plan for a non-
operational turnover and the requisite removal of equipment
previously sold under the Letter of Offer and Acceptance. A
negative decision beyond this date would not permit packing,
preservaticon, and removal of the TACAN and ancillary equipment
by the projected withdrawal date on 24 November. This
inability of GOP, AFP and PAF leaders to agree only




In November, a newly elected President Ramos stepped in
with a compromise in response to the controversial FMS
requirement to turn the base over to the Philippine military
and the "in-house bickering" that ensued. A new PAF wing,
called the "Air Service Support Group" wing was formulated;
this small group of PAF personnel (approximately 425) would
have minimal presence at the airfield to fulfil the FMS
requirement. A plan was drafted to staff the new air support
group at Cubi Point, to reach a total of approximately 200 PAF
personnel by the turnover on 24 November.
Operational problems replaced legal issues during this
last month. Continued maintenance for operations was required
on the TACAN and antenna group equipment which supported
aircraft navigation at NAS Cubi Point, and the new "Air
Service Support Group" personnel were found to be unqualified
(to United States standards) to keep the TACAN System and
Antenna Group in an operational state.
In a joint agreement to support the Equipment Transition
Plan, the United States would provide remote technical support
for on-site monitoring and maintenance of this equipment for
a predetermined period up to February 1994. This would allow
PAF technicians to complete TACAN classroom training in the
United States, including On-the-Job Training at Cubi Point.
The PAF would furnish spare parts and maintenance materials on
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site (as noted in the contract); all other equipment/material
required would be provided via contractor.
TBZ 24th HOUR
Even up until the "24th hour," the NAVAIDS presented an
unresolved problem. AFP/PAF/GOP leaders continued to be at
odds over the equipment they wanted to retain. As late as 19
November, the Philippine Navy requested the United States Navy
include the TACAN in the withdrawal plan of Cubi Point, saying
they had no need for it. RADM Mercer obligingly responded by
including this asset in the equipment to be removed from Cubi
Point. At the last minute the TACAN was torn down and the
deployment of the Contractor Engineering Technical Service
representative who was to depart for the Philippines on
20 November, the following day, needed to be canceled. Yet
the "24th hour" crisis-response effort lingered on, for the
PAF stepped in querying as to why the TACAN was removed and
that there Wa" a need for this piece of equipment. The
directive was issued by a then-bewildered RADM Mercer to just
leave the TACAN in the hangar and the AFP could decide among
themselves just what they wanted done with it. This scenario
typified the level of communication that existed among GOP,
AFP, and PAF leaders throughout the withdrawal effort.
On 24 November 1992, the United States forces withdrawal
from the Republic of the Philippines was successfully
completed. The unique "hot turnover" of NAS Cubi Point was
equally successful, while its future remained unclear.
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THU END OF AN NRA
CAPT Ikuma perused a message by CAPT Bruce Wood,
Commanding Officer for NAS Cubi Point, which articulated the
feelings of so many on the last day of operation for NAS Cubi
Point under United States control:
With great sadness, I report the end of an unforgettable
era in naval aviation. Naval Air Station Cubi Point has
seen its last carrier break, touch and go, and final roll
out. 36 years of service to the fleet has ended... The
field is turned over and the bar is closed. However, the
memories are rich and will live forever. (Wood, 1992)
CAPT Ikuma set down his pen and reviewed carefully his
comprehensive list of "lessons learned." Satisfied that he
had covered all bases in detail, he passed it to his yeoman to




This case provides a Navy example of management controls
used by Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) 1 0 to smoothly execute a last minute major and
unforeseen change to an already partially executed strategic
plan. During the 1992 United States forces withdrawal from
the United States Naval Complex at Subic Bay, Republic of the
Philippines, the Philippine government requested the United
States government turn over to them an airfield that would
remain in an operational status at time of turnover. This
event was subsequently labeled the "hot turnover" 1 1 of Naval
Air Station (NAS) Cubi Point.
This unexpected request by the Government of the
Philippines (GOP) during the partially executed withdrawal
plan required increased effort in the area of strategic
planning to incorporate this new development. Emerging
logistical, financial and training problems required
resolution to ensure the smooth turnover of NAS Cubi Point as
1 0 CINCPACFLT, a U.S. Navy headquarters staff command, was
the executive agent for the withdrawal and closure of the
Naval complex at Subic Bay; while CINCPACFLT was also the
title for ADM Kelly, it is used in the case study to refer to
the headquarters staff only and not ADM Kelly.
""Hot turnover" is a phrase used in this context to
denote a "completely operational" airfield, with all necessary
equipment intact and functioning properly.
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an operational airfield to the Philippines. N•. control
systems would be required to manage the "hot turnover" in the
months remaining to complete the withdrawal.
TEACHING THE CASE
This case could be used as a complementary ý7ase to the
case study written by LT Larry Steckler, entitled, "U.S. Naval
Complex at Subic Bay," January 1993. The former case studied
thie management control system used by CINCPACFLT staff to
capture the overall "vision" of the withdrawal plan. The
intent of this case is to pick up where the former case left
off, the beginning of calendar year 1992, and focus on the
management controls CINCPACFLT staff effected to respond to
the unforeseen "hot turnover" request by the GOP.
Throughout the withdrawal effort and the "hot turnover" of
NAS Cubi Point, the underlying concern revolved around: How
could the United States government, and CINCPACFLT staff in
particular, work within the highly structured environments of
the United States and Philippine governments, to smoothly
execute such a politically sensitive turnover, without
violating any laws and at the same time conclude the turnover
process in such a way that would establish a solid foundation
for future relationships between the two countries?
Numerous laws and policy questions came into play in
establishing turnover and disp- al mechanisms for United
States property to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and to
the GOP. Specifically, these included Foreign Military Sales,
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Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Region Pacific salvage procedures.
Additionally, each month brought new issues with political
ramifications which tested the management control system.
The United States government position on the withdrawal
mandated the United States Navy leave the Philippines as
friends of the Philippine government, military, and people.
Accordingly, all levels in the United States Navy chain of
command involved in the evolution needed to be aware of and
responsible for dealing with politically sensitive problems in
a manner that would accomplish that goal while complying with
United States law and not jeopardizing the ability to complete
the withdrawal as scheduled. Examples of these types of
problems included terminating employment of 12,000 Philippine
employees while relying on them to accomplish the physical
workload associated with the withdrawal effort, protecting
retirement and severance pay for the employees even though
some members of Congress advocated not paying it, ensuring the
Philippine government was given "First Right to Acquire" all
declared Excess Defense Articles prior to public sale, and
agreeing on the definition of removable and non-removable
property.
The myriad of concerns faced by the major players planning
the withdrawal are addressed in the case to allow students to
focus on the issues faced by both the United States and
Philippine governments, assess the situation and formulate
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conclusions as to what management controls were exercised or
could be further refined. Appendix A is provided to give
students an overview of the events leading up to the Subic Bay
closure and United States forces withdrawal.
A method to present this case is to allow students to role
play as Captain (CAPT) Gary Ikuma, Fleet Aviation Material
Readiness Officer at CINCPACFLT headquarters, a key player and
a focal point in the case study, and draft a "lessons learned"
briefing paper for Admiral (ADM) Robert J. Kelly, the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. A subject
theme might include the type of management controls needed to
facilitate a smoother execution of the "hot turnover" in the
politically and legally sensitive environment as described in
the case, mindful of the United States' overall mandate to
leave as friends and ultimate objective to complete the
turnover legally within the given deadline.
The management controls listed at the end of this teaching
note are extracted from those actually drafted by CINCPACFLT
staff for a March 1993 brief on the overall U.S. withdrawal
from the Republic of the Philippines; these management
controls are applied specifically to this case and the "hot
turnover" of NAS Cubi Point by the writer based on affirmation
of CAPT Ikuma. The list can be used by the instructor to
promote discussion with the students on its applicability to
the corporate environment as well.
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WHY USE THIS CASE
This case study is designed to allow graduate students to
analyze the management control process used by CINCPACFLT
staff to integrate the NAS Cubi Point "hot turnover" into the
overall strategic United States forces withdrawal plan. The
case provides study and discussion material for developing and
executing a crisis-response plan, cognizant of the underlying
concerns presented by laws, policies and politics, resulting
in the successful conclusion of the Subic base withdrawal
process and the laying of a foundation for a newly emerging
bilateral relationship between these two countries.
As in the corporate world, the United States government
sometime operates in a crisis response mode. This case
provides an exceptional example of how the United States
government, and the United States Navy in particular,
developed a quick-reaction response to a serious short-fused
dilemma. While the dilemma itself is unique in nature (i.e.,
the "hot turnover" of NAS Cubi Point), the management controls
affected by CINCPACFLT staff to develop, and then alter, their
strategic plan, provides an excellent guideline for developing
a workable plan in a timely manner, given unforeseen
circumstances.
The remainder of this teaching note provides points of
discussion for use by facilitators and identifies a brief
synopsis of some management controls which could be used by
the facilitator to help students discuss and analyze points in
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a classroom environment. Other areas which could be discussed
include CINCPACFLT staff's ability to incorporate these
new/modified control systems. Examples of points could be to
discuss overall system flexibility, rigidity, and ability to
forecast changes due to an ill political wind. With all the
problems and uncertainties, what was it about the staff
organization that allowed an incredibly complex evolution to
be carried off on time and within fiscal and legal
constraints?
If you would like a reproducible copy of the teaching
case, contact Professor K. J. Euske at the Naval Postgraduate
School.
DISCUSSION PONTMS
The concept of "hot turnover" surfaced in February,
shortly after the initial United States withdrawal plans had
commenced execution. The Philippine government had requested
via the American Embassy in Manila that the United States
government leave certain removable equipment behind at Subic
and Cubi. United States representative, Ambassador Frank
Wisner, echoed the United States position that the Mutual
Defense Treaty with the Philippines was one of the pillars of
United States forward defense in Asia. In the long run, it
would be in the United States' interest to have a working
security relationship with this country, and that would
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require at least minimal capability on the part of the
Philippine Armed Forces. (Ikuma, 1993)
United States officials believed a Philippine military
element remaining at Cubi Point would be in the United
States' best interests as it would serve as the most
logical point for the United States to seek future air and
sea "access". (The term "access" throughout the months of
the withdrawal process had become an emotionally charged
and potentially self-defeating term, as the Philippine
press incorrectly tended to equate "access" with a
continued permanent presence, or a "U.S. plot" to stay at
Cubi past 24 November. Consequently, United States
officials spoke in terms of "future cooperation and
interaction.") An Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
role at Cubi would also mean that the AFP could keep
control of the training areas north and west of Cubi.
Should the United States and Philippine Governments
mutually decide in the future for the United States to
gain "access" or promote "cooperation and interaction"
with the Government of the Philippines for transit and
training, the existence of an adequately equipped airport
at Cubi would enhance the chances of success. (Ikuma,
1992b, p. 2) The concept of a "hot turnover" was
requested by the GOP and supported by the American Embassy
Manila in response to these issues.
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CAPT Ikuma provides a fluid synopsis of the emergence of
the "hot turnover" issue and early considerations needed to be
dealt with:
During the withdrawal planning process, the
Philippine government became interested in receiving Cubi
Point as an operational airfield. This evolved into a
"hot turnover" of an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
airfield at Cubi Point. The "hot turnover" concept
initially contradicted the equipment withdrawal guidelines
and strategies. GOP politicos wanted a gratis turnover of
much of the equipment that was non-excess to U.S. needs.
The United States government (American Embassy/State
Department) felt that a "hot turnover" of the Airfield,
facilities and supporting equipment, would enhance the
utility of the field through economic/military purposes,
and serve to establish goodwill in the new relationships
emerging between the two governments.
We prepared a plan for presentation to GOP officials
which identified costs and equipment deemed necessary to
support an IFR airfield. This included non-excess
equipment and excess equipment which would be provided
under Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Initially, every piece of equipment identified in the plan
was asked for by GOP officials including an old,
difficult-to-maintain, Ground Control Approach radar. We
understood that GOP leaders would want to utilize Cubi
Point for civilian purposes also.
The initial turnover plan had three milestones to
effect the turnover process: 1) Identify all the
equipment and conduct a documented turnover. 2) Provide
a training program to operate the equipment, some of which
is totally unique to the U.S. military. 3) Provide parts
support and manuals to support operations through some
undetermined period of time. As stated earlier, a good
deal of the equipment in question was not in excess to the
U.S. Government, yet was necessary to accomplish the "hot
turnover" process. The final planned course of action was
the establishment of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case
to enable the Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) to
purchase non-excess equipment using FMS financial credits.
Because of the scarcity of these funds, the AFP decided to
purchase only a Tactical Aid to Navigation (TACAN) and a
non-directional beacon for navigational aids (no radars),
in addition to support equipment. They also purchased a
logistics support package for this equipment. The value
of the FMS case is $2.37 million US for the equipment and
$2.26 million US for training, support, and spare parts.
Additional equipment obtained through Section 519 (excess
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equipment) completes the turnover package. The airfield
will be a non-radar environment, (minimally) IFR-capable
field. Although the equipment purchased under FMS will
not be compensated for with additional funds for the Navy,
the overall dollar value is relatively small and will have
little if any impact on the U.S. Navy operations.
Early involvement GOP leaders, in clarifying their
desires, would have been extremely useful in developing
the "hot turnover" plan. Many elements of the plan were
constructed without any GOP "subject matter experts"
(i.e., decision makers on-site), until development of the
FMS case. Many elements of the initial plan were
constructed by making assumptions on GOP intentions and
requirements. A decision on who the accepting agency for
the Philippines would be to receive the airfield was not
made until very late in the turnover process. Because of
the ambiguous situation, many amendments and changes
occurred and, consequently, the process was not smooth
until the development of the FMS case. (Steckler, L.,
1992, pp. 35-37)
Throughout the withdrawal and "hot turnover" process, the
biggest hurdle that the United States had to overcome was
there being no single point of contact in the Philippine
government for ADM Kelly, Commander-in-Chief United States
Pacific Fleet, to coordinate with due to the "troika" power
struggles of Olongapo Mayor Richard Gordon, AFP Chief of Staff
Lisandro Abadia, and bases conversion task force director
Alejandro Melchor. Melchor removed himself from the power
struggle as he eventually resigned from his post, and Gordon
was appointed by the newly elected President Ramos to be the
unified point of contact for the United States late in the
turnover process. As the power struggle persisted between
Mayor Gordon and AFP Chief of Staff Abadia, the United States
reaffirmed its desire to foster a smooth transition and
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consequently the need to hear from "one voice." Certainly
this was not the case through most of the withdrawal process.
In meetings held on 14 and 18 May, top level civilian and
military Philippine officials made dramatic strides in
coordinating a single, cohesive concept for the "hot
turnover.t ' This became the first definitive indication the
AFP would have a role in operating Cubi Point, as they
explored the concept of allowing the Philippine Air Force
(PAF) to operate Cubi Point as a joint military-civilian
airfield. The newly developed concept initially resolved the
struggle over military versus commercial use of the facility
by giving the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), headed
by Olongapo Mayor Richard Gordon, a free hand to develop the
vast majority of the facilities commercially, with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines having the right to use some key
facilities. Upon concluding the meeting, a diplomatic note to
the United States embassy was sent, naming Mayor Gordon as the
official Philippine government point of contact in Subic.
In addition to high level meetings, there were two other
positive developments. On 15 May, a Philippine team
consisting of AFP and PAF officers met with United States Navy
officials at Cubi to detail the equipment the PAF would need
to acquire to operate Cubi as an IFR airfield following the
United States withdrawal. This meeting obviated the earlier
Philippine diplomatic note which requested non-Cubi equipment
(e.g., horses, decompression chamber). In the second positive
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development which occurred on May 19, Philippine officials
began manning their official liaison office for the "hot
turnover" and making contacts with their United States
counterparts at Commander, United States Naval Forces
Philippines (COMUSNAVPHIL) staff.
Following the May resignation of Alejandro Melchor from
the presidential task force on bases conversion, there was
dramatic improvement on the Philippine side in coordinating
themselves to handle the conversion of Subic to Philippine
control. Philippine politicos had started late and their
resources did not necessarily match their plans, but United
States officials finally felt that the process of dealing with
the Philippine side on the myriad of withdrawal and
conversion-related issues would proceed smoothly. Although a
reemergence of the struggle for control of Subic conversion
was not ruled out, it appeared that Mayor Gordon was
overwhelmingly in the driver's seat. United States officials
believed that a smooth conversion by the Philippine side would
lessen the perceived need to blame the United States publicly
for Philippine failures and would be beneficial to the
effective rebuilding of the United States/ Republic of the
Philippines security relationship.
A variety of equipment mix options were developed to
support the Cubi Point turnover to the GOP as an operational
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) field. These ranged from full
capacity (essentially current Cubi status) to a basic
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capability IFR field, which lacked radars, but included a
Tactical Aid to Navigation (TACAN), non-directional beacon,
weather measuring equipment, and limited airfield
operations/maintenance equipment. (Appendix B provides
definitions/discussion of radars and navigational aids under
consideration for purchase by the GOP). The removable
equipment turnover costs at estimated replacement value were
$18.1 million US for the full IFR airfield and $6.3 million US
for the basic capability IFR field. Considerations for the
transfer of equipment included realistic expectations of the
GOP's ability to maintain and operate the equipment, much of
which was unique to United States military operations.
By the end of May, the newly confirmed GOP representative
Mayor Gordon had agreed to purchase all excess removable
property for an estimated lump sum of $4.1 million US less the
value of any excess property that could be transferred to the
AFP under Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Assuming
the required 15-day Congressional notification period passed
the United States Congress without objection (which ended 3
June), the discounted price tag would be $613 thousand US.
This deal removed a lot of pressure from the Defense
Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO); however, if it fell
through, DRMO would be hard put to auction off all of the
excess before closing down the facilities.
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In early October 1992, the "warm turnover" 12 of Cubi
Point continued to be complicated by disagreement within the
GOP over the use of the airfield. Philippine Undersecretary
Singson, Mayor Gordon, AFP Commodore Madamba, AFP Chief of
Staff General Abadia, and General Estrellado of the 15th
Strike Wing had reached a total impasse on the matter and it
was referred to President Ramos for a decision.
The impasse revolved around the numbers of 15th Strike
Wing personnel moving to Cubi Point (presence), what
buildings they would be allowed to occupy (office space
and hangars), and accommodations for their families
(housing). (Mercer, 1993b)
Gordon did not want significant military presence on the Subic
Bay complex because he feared it would detract from the appeal
of the facility to commercial investors; he was unwilling to
accept more than a token military presence unless ordered by
Ramos. RADM Mercer described the Cubi Point problem as
directly linked to the problem of future access arrangements:
General Abadia has never wavered in his strong assertion
that the key to future military-to-military relations
between our two governments lies in a successful "hot
turnover" of Cubi Point and its operation by the AFP.
Mayor Gordon, however, is being told by investors, both
Filipino and international, that they are not interested
in investing if the AFP will be present in any significant
numbers at Cubi. (Mercer, 1993b)
As the end of October neared, U.S. Navy authorities were
anxiously awaiting a decision by GOP leaders, to preclude
12
"Warm turnover" was a new phrase coined by the staff of
the American Embassy Manila after the GOP opted for the basic
IFR field and its usefulness as a "fully operational" airfield
became questionable.
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having to dismantle and remove the non-excess aerodrome
equipment if military forces were not present to receive the
equipment. Philippine Secretary of Defense DeVilla and
President Ramos were definite in their stance for an AFP
presence at Cubi Point. Not only did they not want to
jeopardize the turnover of aerodrome equipment, but also in
jeopardy was a potential future military access arrangement
with the United States as the 1991 destruction of Clark Air
Base by Mount Pinatubo had left only Subic Bay/Cubi Point as
a feasible option.
By early November the dispute had been resolved: In lieu
of a major air base wing (15th Strike Wing) desired by General
Abadia, an "air group level equivalent" of 300-500 men and
several small aircraft was stationed at Cubi to keep the
airfield operational after the United States Navy departed.
There would be no housing for military families at Cubi Point
-- a concession to SBMA Chairman Gordon. Ramp space at the
airfield was divided between the civilian and military users,
with the military occupying the western portion of the
airfield. This agreement on shared military/civilian use of
Cubi Point did meet United States requilements for the FMS
sale of $4.8 million US in aerodrome equipment, spares and
training for the operation of Cubi Point airfield.
The withdrawal was completed legally and on schedule on 24
November 1992. CAPT Ikuma recalled the words of ADM Larson,
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(USCINCPAC), the senior military officer in charge of all
United States forces in the Pacific region:
In my judgement, the long-term legal ramifications and
adverse impact on worldwide precedent of any shortcuts,
real or perceived, to the correct implementation of
property disposition policy outweighs any short-term
political value. Our Subic withdrawal is predicated on
professionalism; the proper disposition of removable
assets is paramount to its success. (Ikuma, 1993)
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MANAGEMENT CONTROLS IN
THE OHOT TURNOVERN OF NAB CUBI POINT1 3 :
1. Establishment of higher authority ownership and commitment
(Chief of Naval Operations/Secretary of the Navy/Secretary of
Defense levels.)
This ownership and commitment by higher authority to the
base closure plan and established timetable for closure was
absolutely essential. Issues beyond ADM Kelly's (Commander-
in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet) control occasionally
threatened his ability to accomplish the withdrawal as
scheduled. Occasional intervention at the levels mentioned
were necessary to overcome obstacles. This was particularly
evident with the letter from the Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSAA) elaborating on Congressional concerns and their
intent to delay the transfer of excess material to the
Philippine government while they deliberated the issue.
2. Designation of single on-site coordinator.
From the onset, ADM Kelly made it known that he was in
charge of the United States forces withdrawal and Subic Bay
closure.
At the area coordination level in the Philippines, RADM
Mercer, Commander United States Naval Forces Philippines
(COMUSNAVPHIL), was designated by ADM Kelly as the single on-
site point of contact and coordinator of the actual
withdrawal. (See Exhibit III for organizational chart.)
3. Identify individual points of contact at each level of
management.
This too was essential to facilitate communications, data
gathering and problem avoidance. There were numerous
stovepipe1 4 activities which belonged to major claimants
other than that of the Pacific Fleet, such as Naval Air and
Naval Sea Systems Commands; thus overall coordination of the
base closure was difficult due to many different chains of
command and their respective priorities. To carry out his
tasking, RADM Mercer established a staff withdrawal
coordination group to coordinate all actions associated with
physical departure, among the many different commands in the
Subic Bay/Cubi Point complex. This group kept RADM Mercer
informed of progress and problems, and prepared bi-weekly
13 Management controls are extracted from CINCPACFLT
"Withdrawal Plan" brief on withdrawal management and oversight
processes. (CINCPACFLT, N5A, 1993)
14 A stovepipe is a command organization with fiscal
interests in the Philippines, but not fiscally or
operationally responsible to CINCPACFLT.
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situation reports for his use in reporting to ADM Kelly.
Designation of these individual points of contact enabled
coordination and problem resolution.
4. Clear establishment of decision making authority was
essential.
Due to the Troika power struggle, this got off to a rocky
start; however, the Government of the Philippines (GOP)
political situation finally stabilized somewhat during May,
the fifth month of the li-month withdrawal process. Mayor
Gordon was eventually appointed as the Philippine government's
"single point of contact" to coordinate with the United States
Navy, and the newly elected President Ramos ultimately
provided the needed support from Manila for Mayor Gordon.
Only then were decisions critical to the hot turnover process
able to be made and problems resolved.
5. Establish good communication between withdrawal
coordinators and local comunity leaders.
The withdrawal coordinators needed to work closely with
local community leaders, and Mayor Gordon in particular, to
ensure their interests were known and protected to the extent
possible. Such openness helped to prevent negative publicity
and result in easier problem resolution.
6. Establish management control group for logistics.
Logistics operations encompass the majority of planning,
coordination and physical withdrawal in any base closure
process. RADM Mercer established the "logistics planning
cell" as a management control group to manage the time line
for cargo shipment, excess equipment turn-in/disposal to the
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO)1 5 , turn-
over of purchased equipment to the GOP, vacating buildings,
and turnover of real estate. Establishing this "logistics
planning cell", made up of senior members of each command or
activity located in the Subic Bay/Cubi Point complex, provided
the most efficient and productive method of accomplishing the
massive logistics effort, thus incorporating all commands into
the planning process.
7. Implement program of strict accountability.
Shortly after the withdrawal commenced, large quantities
of government assets were moved around the base. Material and
equipment underwent inventory, relocation, packing, crating,
shipping, and disposal. The volume of asset movement made
security of government owned assets significantly more
difficult. It was essential to have a clear audit trail for
1 5DRMO is the disposal agent for all removable property
excess to U.S. Navy or DOD needs.
50
subsequent use by the General Accounting Office, service audit
agencies, and Inspectors General.
8. Include Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRJO)
in every aspect of initial planning through final execution.
Excess property disposal was a key element in the
successful turnover and withdrawal. DRMO senior personnel
were included in every aspect of the initial planning through
final execution. A firm schedule was established for steady
turn-in of excess defense articles and hazardous wastes to
DRMO for disposal in accordance with applicable U.S. laws and
Defense Logistics Agency directives. Procedures were
developed, agreed to by local officials and higher authority,
and published well in advance to ensure 100 percent of the
excess material was accommodated in a timely fashion,
maintaining full accountability and audit trails. This area
required special attention because of the inflexibility of
some laws, rules and regulations (e.g. equipment sold through
Foreign Military Sales and equipment transferred via Section
519 of the Foreign Assistance Act). If not managed properly,
the disposal process could have become the cause of delay in
completing the withdrawal.
9. Establish "Drop Dead" Dates.
This management control tool was used throughout the
withdrawal turnover process. June 1 was established as the
milestone date for identifying any hot turnover items. After
that date, major equipment shipped out and increased personnel
transfers resulted in less equipment and training
opportunities available. United States Navy personnel had
spent a considerable amount of time educating the various GOP
officials on how to exercise GOP "right of first option to
acquire" in the DRMO process. As of June, GOP officials had
not yet exercised this option, apparently waiting until the
new Ramos administration was in place.
Another "drop dead" date of 1 November was established in
an attempt to alleviate what was described as ADM Kelly's
"worst nightmare": the apparent lack of funds the Philippine
government had to purchase removable excess property. The
lack of government funds was driving a number of requests by
the GOP to the United States to turn over property free of
charge. ADM Kelly consequently established the 1 November
"drop dead" date for GOP officials to execute its FMS options,
so that the United States Navy had time to ship out any
equipment GOP leaders opted not to buy.
10. Identify agent to officially receive custody of
facilities.
Agents were identified early in the withdrawal process as
facilities became vacated. Knowing who was to be responsible
for security and maintenance of the property after turnover,
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enabled early joint development of a turnover plan and
schedule. Inordinate delay in identifying the new custodian
would have adversely impacted the ability to vacate.
11. Develop cargo and personnel transportation plan.
A major tool that was developed early in the withdrawal
planning phase was a cargo and personnel transportation plan.
Time Phased Force Deployment Directive (TPFDD) methodology was
utilized to identify what was to be shipped, when it was to be
shipped and to where it was to be shipped. This document
provided a planning and control mechanism to schedule movement
of assets and people on base and availability of ships/planes
for transportation.
12. Establishment of Program Definition Conference (PDC).
Once Mayor Gordon finally submitted his request to procure
equipment, thus signalling his intent to proceed with plans to
assume operation of the airfield at Cubi Point, the Program
Definition Conference (PDC) was established. The PDC was
conducted jointly by the U.S. Navy and representatives of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) to discuss for the first time
requirements to support the hot turnover. A plan of six FMS
cases were identified and a schedule established to transfer
the material, allowing sufficient time before the deadline.
The Equipment Transition Plan was developed during the PDC for
planning purposes, to be solidified through future FMS cases.
13. Early identification of required training.
The Program Definition Conference Group was established to
develop a program to sufficiently train Philippine Air Force(PAF) personnel the necessary skills to keep Cubi Point
operational after the United States Navy departure.
Contingencies were established for teaching English
terminology, equipment operations and maintenance procedures.
14. Early identification of mission essential personnel.
This was a major cost cutting initiative. Persons
determined not essential were scheduled for early transfer or
employment termination. Reduced numbers of personnel on board
significantly reduced administrative burdens of personnel
management and support functions. As Cubi Point personnel
steadily shrank to a skeleton crew, ADM Kelly still felt
committed to maintain services until the actual turnover.
Therefore, personnel identified as mission essential were kept
on board for as long as possible to maintain the equipment in
an operational capacity and perform as much On-The-Job
Training (OJT) as time permitted.
15. Provide GOP officials the tools to make a decision.
CAPT Ikuma developed three options for consideration,
ranging from an airfield with bare minimum capability to that
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of full range capability. ADM Larson (USCINCPAC) proposed
CAPT Ikuma's three options outlined in the case to Mayor
Gordon, in an effort to minimize delays that were jeopardizing
the critical time line. These options provided Mayor Gordon
with the tools to make an educated decision as to how
operational an airfield he wanted turned over. Opting for the
basic Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capability, GOP officials
finally had a "gameplan" with which to negotiate with ADM
Kelly on funding and related concerns such as civilian vs.
military use of the airfield.
16. Develop Contingency Plan for last minute crises.
ADM Kelly was fully prepared to fall back on his
contingency plan to ship all equipment out should GOP
officials not be able to either fund the newly acquired
equipment or abide by the legal requirement to have military
presence at Cubi Point. Even through October, the turnover of
Cubi Point to the GOP was complicated by disagreement within
the GOP top ranks over use of the airfield. GOP and Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) leaders were well aware of the
fact that the FMS contract for non-excess airfield equipment
had always been keyed to an AFP presence at Cubi Point and
transfer would only be accomplished on a military-to-military
basis. A meeting on the use of Cubi Point between AFP
Commodore Madamba, Gordon and others on September 30 had
reached a total impasse and the matter was eventually referred
to President Ramos for a decision. President Ramos ultimately
settled the question of military use of Cubi Point in order to
meet FMS requirements and a compromise of a much smaller "air
service support group" wing was sent in lieu of the 15th
Strike Wing.
17. Maintain flight safety as an issue in negotiations.
USCINCPAC was the authorized United States representative
during the 15 May 92 Philippines Mutual Defense Board strategy
meeting; presuming GOP leaders would decide on a joint
civilian-military use for Cubi, the decision was made at this
meeting to use FMS as a vehicle for the "hot turnover".
Several safety concerns were noted when comparing the plans as
drafted by USCINCPAC and the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The
PAF plan was reasonable with the exception of the inclusion of
the Precision Approach Radar (PAR). Because of the
operational requirement for intensive specialized training,
and thus a major safety concern if improperly maintained and
operated, USCINCPAC needed to decide whether to sell this
radar as part of the package. Meanwhile, the Air Surveillance
Radar (ASR-8), good for safety and future interoperability,
was strongly desired by the PAF, yet its high price of $7.9
million US did not allow it within the "$4 million US"
package. (See Appendix B for definition/comparison of
radars).
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The following recommendations were supported after review
of the plans developed by CINCPACFLT, a Navy component
command, and submitted by USCINCPAC and the PAF:
1. Support the "hot turnover" of NAS Cubi Point which
provides for the basic (non-PAR) Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
capability with a radar environment (ASR-8). Rough
acquisition cost: $15.07 million US.
2. Emphasize the need for logistics and training support
as immediate consideration once the decision was made on
desired capabilities.
3. Suggest the AFP should not bear costs of
"civilianizing" Cubi Point with Instrument Landing System
(ILS)/VOR-DME; the costs should be borne by the Philippine
civil aviation administration.
Ultimately, GOP leaders opted not to buy the ASR-8 due to
funding constraints, and went with the basic IFR capability
with NO radars. The operational capacity and safety of Cubi
Point airfield was now quite questionable.
18. Remain steadfast under foreign "political pressure".
Throughout the "troika power struggle" of Gordon, Melchor
and Abadia, each player sought the support of the United
States to enhance their position in the political arena. The
United States held the position of not getting caught in the
middle of this tense power play and focused on dealing with
one point of contact, namely Mayor Gordon. As events
escalated and GOP tempers flared, United States officials
remained cautious, resolute in their mandate to "leave as
friends." United States officials became even more wary as
they shunned Melchor's pursuit for "special deals" in a delay
tactic of the entire withdrawal evolution.
In the latter months, ADM Kelly and RADM Mercer maintained
the position that it would not be in the best interest of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) or the United States to
allow the equipment identified for FMS sale or Section 519
transfer to be diverted to civilian, non-military use. This
could establish a precedent that would allow the GOP to siphon
equipment/programs intended for military use to civilian
projects without United States consent.
The AFP did eventually purchase the FMS equipment legally,
as there was AFP presence at the time of turnover, however
minimal, which consisted of the PAF 15th Air Strike Wing.
Despite Mayor Gordon's vows to turn the airfield completely
commercial, 2ubi Point still had military presence at the
writing of this case one year after turnover.
19. Daily monitoring.
Daily monitoring of the withdrawal progress and regularly
scheduled reports to headquarters level and higher authority
were essential to keeping decision makers informed for quick
problem solving.
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20. Public Affairs guidance developed for all levels of
management.
This was developed early in the withdrawal process to
ensure information about the withdrawal was publicized in
accordance with policy. The media was kept fully informed of
withdrawal progress to preclude speculation and unnecessary
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APPENDIX A
OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES FORCES WITHDRAWAL FROM SUBIC
This appendix is provided as an overview of the overall
withdrawal effort of United States forces from the
Philippines. The data has been excerpted in its entirety from
a complementary case study written by LT Larry J. Steckler,
entitled: "A Management Case Study: The U.S. Withdrawal and
Subsequent Closure of the U.S. Naval Facility at Subic Bay,
Republic of the Philippines." Review of this appendix will
provide the reader a better understanding of the strategic
planning process used to support the withdrawal and base
closure, and enable the reader to gain insight on a subset of
this withdrawal process: the OHOT TURNOVER" of NAS Cubi
Point.
BACKGROUND
In December 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the
Foreign Bases Treaty Agreement and forced the United States
government to implement withdrawal and closure plans for the
United States Naval Base at Subic Bay, Republic of the
Philippines.
The negotiations between the Philippine and United States
governments for long-term United States military basing rights
at Subic Bay in the Philippines had been ongoing through much
of the 1980's. By the middle of 1991, the negotiation and
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treaty ratification process had become suspect because
factions of the Philippine government, namely the Philippine
Senate, were giving indications that the treaty might not be
ratified as proposed. The possibility of at least a partial
United States withdrawal became more likely with each passing
day.
The Naval Base at Subic Bay was a huge, sprawling
facility, encompassing more than 23,000 acres of land and
water, which served aircraft and ships of the United States
Seventh Fleet. Some of the facilities at the base included a
fully capable airfield, a ship repair facility, aviation
intermediate depot maintenance activities, a fuel farm to
support ship and base fueling needs, a hospital, a naval
supply center, several deep draft piers to support the United
States Navy's largest ships and submarines, and all of the
infrastructure necessary to support 22,000 permanent workers
and residents. Base support was also occasionally extended to
as many as 11,000 transient sailors and marines from visiting
United States Navy ships.
CINCPACFLT was the executive agent for the withdrawal and
closure of the Naval complex at Subic Bay. A large U.S. Navy
headquarters staff employing Total Quality Management/Total
Quality Leadership principles, CINCPACFLT conducted the
strategic planning and devised the subsequent management
controls which were used by subordinates to implement the
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personnel withdrawal, equipment disposition, ammunition
withdrawal and the facility/base closure plans.
Due to the nature, complexity, and voluminous amounts of
data available, the original case explored events occurring
from the middle of calendar year 1991 through the beginning of
calendar year 1992, to illustrate the evolution of management
controls by Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) and its implementation of planning strategies for
the United States naval base closure.
THE PLANNING PROCESS
In the late summer of 1991, Admiral Kelly, Commander-in-
Chief United States Pacific Fleet, chaired a roundtable
meeting at staff headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Participants in the roundtable discussion group included the
CINC's personal staff, the deputy CINC, deputy and assistant
chiefs of staff (division heads), and the twenty-three
standing members of the Philippine Working Group (PWG). The
meeting was held to discuss the implications of continued U.S.
Navy presence at Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines.
Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, ADM Kelly was
determined that th' Pacific Fleet would be ready and able to
effect any emerging strategy regarding the Navy's interests in
the Pacific.
During the meeting, Admiral Kelly expressed his beliefs
that should the base negotiations fail and end in treaty
rejection, the subsequent base withdrawal and closure process
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"would be the single most important thing accomplished by the
Pacific Fleet in 1992." He was adamant that the Pacific Fleet
staff make whatever preparations were necessary to explore
options and write a plan for withdrawal which, if required,
could be implemented on extremely short notice.
Two sets of plans were reviewed in depth. One was the
Facilities Closure Plan (FCP) which was constructed in the
mid-1980's and looked broadly at eight core areas to be
considered in a foreign base withdrawal and closure. The
other plan was known as the 1989 Bases Relocation Plan, which
was a plan to conduct withdrawal under conditions of political
or military turmoil.
In late August 1991, analysis of the political
undercurrents in the Philippines indicated that the
negotiations might not yield a treaty acceptable to all the
political powers involved. Given the prospect of at least a
partial withdrawal, ADM Kelly ordered a "Strawman Plan" to
outline what the course of action might be. The Strawman was
to be very broad in nature with loosely defined goals, but
incorporate "some" level of detail which could be used to
facilitate current and future withdrawal planning. Both, the
Facility Closure Plan and the Bases Relocation Plan, were used
as a foundation of Strawman.
RADM Mercer's (COMUSNAVPHIL) staff, operating the United
States facilities at Subic Bay in the Philippines, were a
great source to generate ideas and evaluate proposals for
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Strawman. The personnel on RADM Mercer's staff were closest
to the issues and should have had the best feel for what might
and might not work. The in-country staff would also be the
primary agents to conduct a withdrawal if the basing
negotiations deteriorated. However, the CINCPACFLT staff had
been given direction to minimize contact with in-country
personnel because of the "politically secret" nature of the
base negotiation process. This security step was considered
necessary to assure an effective negotiation.
The almost daily changing political scene in the
Philippines and the "closed door" nature of the negotiations
greatly influenced the building of Strawman. The Facility
Closure Plan (FCP), CINCPACFLT staff, and new data from sites
outside the Philippines were the most useful sources for
evolving a plan.
REALITY
The Philippine Senate rejected the negotiated bases treaty
agreement on 17 September 1991. One plausible explanation for
the treaty rejection was an attempt by elements of the
Philippine government to extract a higher price from the
United States for the basing concessions, thereby using the
treaty and its potential ratification as a bargaining tool.
In any case, the Military Bases Agreement (MBA), executed in
1988, provided that the bases would be maintained in the
Philippines at least until 31 December 1991. Additionally,
the United States would have one year from 31 December 1991 to
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close the bases if terms for a new basing agreement could not
be reached by that time. Concurrent with the Philippine
Senate's rejection of the negotiated treaty the Philippine
constitution had also been re-written, which included a
provision for immediate disestablishment of all foreign
military bases on Philippine soil.
MOMUETUM
While the executive branch of the Philippine government
acknowledged opposition to the treaty, outright treaty
rejection by the Philippine Senate was largely unanticipated.
The significance of the Philippine Senate vote created great
confusion in determining the true scope of the wishes of the
Philippine government. On the one hand, the Philippine
President and many of the Philippine people supported the
bases. Conversely, the Philippine congress was against the
bases as indicated by the vote. However, there would be
several more months of political wrangling before the true
fate of the bases would be determined.
When the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty in
September 1991, CINCPACFLT staff already knew much of what
they were up against if a full withdrawal was warranted.
Strawman contained a rough time table with concepts and major
functions outlined, and was considered a good blueprint by
staff planners for any future planning effort.
In late September 1991, ADM Kelly called another
roundtable meeting to discuss options and ramifications in
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dealing with the variables surrounding the rejection of the
basing treaty. Various mission contingency and withdrawal
options were discussed. The main thrust of the meeting was to
determine the effects of the treaty rejection, and develop
options to address those impacts.
Strawman was one of the options presented, and was chosen
for continued staffing as it was the most likely overall
course of action given the events of the time. By the end of
September, ADM Kelly had approved the major elements of
Strawman with some qualifications. Additional planning was
required to ensure adequate base security during drawdown,
member and dependent quality of life was maintained at the
highest level possible during the drawdown, and that
relocation of commands in the Philippines affected by the
withdrawal be re-evaluated within the context of a reduced
overall Pacific Fleet force structure. By the first week in
December, Strawman was considered complete by Admiral Kelly,
but was not yet approved by authority above CINCPACFLT for
execution.
Following the Philippine elections in the fall of 1991,
President Aquino attempted to revive the treaty debate within
her government. However, these efforts failed to reverse the
inertia of events following the Philippine Senate vote. By
mid-December the effort by the Philippine executive branch to
keep the base, in the Philippines was viewed as an overall
failure. While the provisions in the revised Philippine
65
constitution for early closing of the bases had failed, the
United States' remaining hope for keeping the Philippine bases
had been quashed. On 31 December 1991, the one year time
clock, as dictated by the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT),
began ticking for the United States to remove its military
presence from the Philippines. Initial projections indicated
the Pacific Fleet would meet the one year time constraints
contained in the MDT and would complete the processes before
the 1992 Christmas Holidays.
IMPLEM3TATION
The Pacific Fleet Philippine Withdrawal Plan was prepared
for implementation in January 1992. The plan was transmitted
as a directive to organizations above and below the CINCPACFLT
chain of command. To subordinates and stovepipe16
organizations, the directive initiated withdrawal operations.
For superiors, the directive included provisions that, unless
otherwise told, execition of the withdrawal plan would begin
immediately. In late January and early February, CINCPACFLT,
the Naval Forces component commander under United States
Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC), gave detailed
briefings of the plan's provisions to USCINCPAC, Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), and the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV).
16 A stovepipe is a command organization with fiscal
interests in the Philippines, but not fiscally or
operationally responsible to CINCPACFLT.
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United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific is a joint
command made up of elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy and
Marines and is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
to carry out strategic and tactical doctrine consistent with
United States' political and military goals in the Pacific,
Indian and Southeast Asian theaters. CNO/SECNAV ensure all
United States Naval forces meet readiness requirements to
support JCS doctrine and own most of the infrastructure to
support Naval forces worldwide. They all approved the
Philippine withdrawal plan as briefed.
The strategy for implementing the United States Navy
closure was conceptually built around individual functional
plans (e.g., facility closure, security, civilian/military/
Filipino personnel, equipment/ammunition/property removal and
disposal, and environmental closure). These individual plans
began as elements of Strawman and had been refined over the
months leading up to implementation. RADM Mercer's staff in
the Philippines did not see these plans in detail until a few
days prior to receipt of the implementing directive in January
1992.
Facilities turnover and the security plan were highly
integrated within the overall withdrawal plan. CINCPACFLT
staff provided oversight and coordination for ADM Kelly, while
RADM Mercer's staff was responsible for physical
accomplishment of the withdrawal effort. As selected portions
of real estate were turned over to the Government of the
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Philippines (GOP), the remaining facilities would serve as
support structures to conduct the next phase of the turnover.
Once facility turnover commenced, entire areas of real estate
would be relinquished and the security perimeter collapsed.
Several housing areas, a communications center and the Naval
Station were the first areas given to the Government of the
GOP. This included most of the Naval Station infrastructure,
the ship repair facility, the Public Works Center and many
ship piers. Preceding the next perimeter collapse, the
hospital was turned over. Final facilities turnover would
occur at the Cubi Point Naval Air Station to include the Naval
Magazines, the Naval Supply Depot marehouse compound, fuel
farm, airfield, infrastructure and remaining ship piers.
Turnover of all the facilities at Subic, including Cubi
Point, were elements of the original Strawman Plan. Only
after implementation began did ADM Kelly get any indication
that additional planninc- and action would be required to
provide a "Hot Turnover" of the facilities at Cubi Point. The
hot turnover was an amazing development designed between the
two governments. From the United States' perspective, the hot
turnover was an effort to establish a post-Subic
U.S./Philippine government relationship on a firm footing.
For the Philippine government, the hot turnover would be a
first step in encouraging strong ties with the United States
and would provide a cornerstone to thb economic viability of




1. Air Surveillance Radar (ASR-8) - ASR is designed to
provide surveillance and separation control of aircraft
approaching the field. ASR gives a two-dimensional air
picture within 80NM of the field. It allows discrete target
track and altitude throughout the approach environment. It
also allows "non-precision" (azimuth only) instrument
approaches through radar operator guidance to the aircraft.
The ASR-8 is good for safety and future interoperability, but
its high price precluded it from inclusion in the USCINCPAC
"$4M" package. Nonetheless, PAF strongly desired the ASR-8.
2. Tactical Aid to Navigation (TACAN) - The TACAN is a
military navigation aid for non-precision approaches; gives
azimuth (bearing) and distance in UHF/VHF spectrums,
respectively.
3. VOR-DME - The civilian equivalent of the U.S. DOD
"TACAN" NAVAID; a must for civilian non-precision approaches.
As with the TACAN, VOR-DME gives azimuth and distance in
UHF/VHF spectrums, respectively.
4. Instrument Landing System (ILS) - A far better choice
for a precision approach. Unlike Precision Approach Radar
(PAR), it needs no operators to guide the aircraft. It uses
a single electronic unit to transmit azimuth/glide slope to
the aircraft instruw--: ý. ILS is used by both the United
States Air Force (US ,.. nd commercial aircraft. A f t e r
turnover of Cubi, an k case could be arranged with the USAF
for ILS procurement, since Cubi Point did not have ILS.
Alternatively, and preferably, as future co-operator of Cubi,
the Philippine Civil Aviation Administration could procure the
ILS commercially along with the VOR-DME.
5. Precision Approach Radar (PAR) - This radar gives Cubi
Point "precision" instrument approach capability (i.e. both
azimuth and glide slope). PAR operators transmit this
guidance to the aircraft via voice. PAR is both expensive
($5.5M) and antiquated. It is very hard to support, and
requires intensive specialized training for both operators and
maintainers. Removing the PAR (GCA) would leave Cubi without
"precision" instrument approach capability; however, if
improperly maintained and operated, it can become a major
safety concern. Nonetheless, the Philippine Air Force (PAF)
considered its purchase, if low cost.
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6. Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) - Transmits an
omnidirectional "homing" signal; indication of the direction
to the airfield is presented in aircraft instruments.
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APPENDIX C
AFP .......... Armed Forces of the Philippines
BCDA ......... Bases Conversion Development Authority
DRMO ......... Defense Reutilization and Marketing Region
DSAA ......... Defense Security Assistance Agency
EDA .......... Excess Defense Articles
FAA .......... Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
FMS .......... Foreign Military Sales
GCA .......... Ground Control Approach
GOP .......... Government of the Philippines
IFR .......... Instrument Flight Rules
ILS .......... Instrument Landing System
LOA .......... Letter of Offer and Acceptance
MBA .......... Military Bases Agreement of 1947
MDB .......... Mutual Defense Board
MDT .......... Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952
MSC .......... Military Sealift Command
MTT .......... Mobile Training Team
NAVAIDS ...... Navigational Aids
NSD .......... Naval Supply Detachment
NDB .......... Non-Directional Beacon
PAF .......... Philippine Air Force
PAR .......... Precision Approach Radar
PATO ......... Philippine Air Traffic Organization
PDC .......... Program Definition Conference
SBMA ......... Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
TACAN ........ Tactical Aid to Navigation
TPFDD ........ Time Phased Force Deployment Database
USAF ......... United States Air Force
USN .......... United States Navy




The following chronology is a concise sequence of events
of the Cubi Point turnover; the majority of data has been
excerpted from point papers drafted by CAPT Gary Ikuma,
CINCPACFLT Fleet Aviation Material Readiness Officer.
- Cubi closure team established to coordinate planning and
execution
- Based on withdrawal plan, all NAS Cubi Pt equipment not on
non-removable property list to be shipped out or turned over
to DRMO as excess; NAS Cubi Pt to become uncontrolled, basic
day and night VFR field
- Installation Restoration: Under 1947 MBA, base does n
have to be returned to condition it was when first occupied
American Embassy Manila requests USCINCPAC to consider
turnover of NAS Cubi Pt as a functioning airfield
- PAF interested in moving operations to NAS Cubi Pt
-GOP undecided on financing a military/commercial use mix
- CAPT Ikuma's three turnover options proposed to ADM Kelly
and adopted by USCINCPAC for MDB talks
- Decision made to use FMS as vehicle for "hot turnover"
- Sale of non-excess equipment to provide a basic IFR-capable
airfield (approx $4 million plus admin fees - $5 million
total)
- GOP express clear intent for AFP use of airfield; American
Embassy confirms GOP joint use decision for Cubi Pt
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- AFP accepts Cubi Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section
519; items not wanted by AFP were purchased by GOP under
"First Right to Acquire"
- GOP requests FMS purchases of other Subic/Cubi items
"considered essential" to APP modernization
- USCINCPAC FMS turnover plan balanced against AFP FMS plan
- The current plan being executed calls for all NAS Cubi Point
equipment not on the non-removable property list to be shipped
out or turned over to DRMO as excess (almost all major
property supporting flight operations at NAS Cubi are not
excess)
- At turnover (still projected to be Dec 92 at this point),
Cubi will be at best an uncontrolled, basic day and night VFR
field; material remaining will be:
- operable taxi/runway/ramp lights
- operable fuel farm
- operable basic utilities (electric power, water, sewage,
telephone switch)
- No radios, NAVAIDS, radars, wx forecasting equipment are
scheduled to remain; although would further enhance field
capabilities, equipment is NOT considered excess to Navy
needs. These items can be purchased by the GOP at FULL
REPLACEMENT costs.
- The following items have been declared excess (because of
age, minimal value, obsolescence, etc.); field capabilities
would be enhanced if the GOP acquired these items through FMS
purchase (at greatly reduced cost) from DRMO under first
option to acquire, or if the AFP receives it under Section
519, Foreign Assistance Act transfer:
- meteorological equipment to provide basic aviation
weather measuring capability (wind speed/direction,
barometric pressure, temperature)
- several fuel/tanker/crash and fire trucks/baggage carts
- several utility vans/trucks/passenger vehicles
- one large aircraft tow tractor
- GOP has yet to identify specific equipment (i.e., NAVAIDS,
radars, support equipment, etc.) desired; neither have any
training requirements been made known
- President-elect Ramos sworn into office
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JULI
- Program Definition Conference held from 20 July - 4 August
1992
- Withdrawal date moved up to 24 November, as recommended by
RADM Mercer
AUGUS
- Equipment Transition Plan developed, which represents a
mutual understanding of the actions and responsibilities
required to successfully transfer selected equipment from NAS
Cubi Pt to the PAF
- Letter of Intent signed by General Abadia and RADM Mercer,
formalizing the "hot turnover" request
- Airfield will be fully IFR capable through 1 September
SEPTBMER
- Commodore Delgado (AFP Joint Staff) signs Letter of Offer
and Acceptance on 15 September to purchase NAS Cubi air
traffic control/support equipment, training and technical
assistance
- RADM Mercer concerned that sale/purchase may be illegal,
since Mayor Gordon intends minimal (or NO) AFP presence at
Subic/Cubi
- Airfield will be non-radar IFR, precision approach capable
(NDB/TACAN/GCA) from 1 September through 15 October
OCTOBER
- Airfield will be non-radar IFR, non-precision approach
capable (NDB/TACAN) from 15 October through 24 November
- Terms of LOA for AFP to take possession of equipment appear
likely to be met
- Agreement on shared military/civilian use of Cubi Point
meets United States requirements for FMS sale of $4.8 million
US of equipment, spares and training
- AFP personnel (military and civilian) are being provided OJT
on FMS and Section 519 (excess) equipment; OJT proceeding well
- equipment to be transferred will remain under U.S. control
until turnover
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- Hot refueling pits are closed; fueling is by trucks only
- Airfield services (fueling, flight line, tower,
crash/rescue, etc.) will remain under U.S. supervision until
turnover
XOVzMBZR
- FMS credits have transferred and the AFP effectively owns
the airfield equipment
- All 519 property inventoried and turned over to AFP
- Remaining excess equipment has been purchased in place by
SBMA
- Remaining non-excess property is staged at NSD to be loaded
in MSC ships




Documents reviewed during study of United States Forces
Withdrawal and "Hot Turnover" issues.
DATE / CQRRSPONDENC SUBJECT/TITLE AUTNOR/ORIGINATOR
30Mar92 Point Paper NAS Cubi Point CAPT G. Ikuma
Hot Turnover.
071830APR92 MSG NAS Cubi Point CINCPACFLT
Turnover.
180104MAY92 MSG Cubi Closure COMFAIRWESTPAC
Sitrep 11.
7May92 Point Piaper NAS Cubi Point CAPT G. Ikuma
Hot Turnover.
14May92 Point Paper NAS Cubi Point CAPT G. Ikuma
Hot Turnover Update.




180916MAY92 MSG Philippine Diplo- AMEMBASSY, MANILA
matic Note on
Excess Property.




2Jun92 Point Paper NAS Cubi Point CAPT G. Ikuma
Hot Turnover Update.
10Jun92 LOA 1992 Letter of Offer RADM J.W. Snyder
and Acceptance for Navy Internat'l
non-excess Cubi Programs Office
Point equipment. Commodore Delgado
AFP Joint Staff
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310905JUL92 MSG Program Definition NAS CUBI PT RP
Conference.
31Jul92 Point Paper NAS Cubi Point CAPT G. Ikuma
Hot Turnover Update.
100003AUG92 MSG Cubi Air Ops NAS CUBI PT RP
Progress Report
as of 5 Aug 92.
241930AUG92 MSG Philippine With- CINCPACFLT
drawal Sitrep Eight.
10ct92 Point Paper Legal Issues WRT CDR Luzynski
Cubi Point FMS Case.
150ct92 Point Paper Status of NAS Cubi CAPT G. Ikuma
Point Hot Turnover.
170ct92 MOA 1988 Memorandum of Foreign Secretary
Agreement on U.S. R.S. Manglapus
Facilities in the Sec. of State
Philippines. G.P. Schultz
3005500CT92 MSG Closure of NAS Cubi CINCPACFLT
Point.




Allen, V., Defense Security Assistance Agency memo, May 1992.
CINCPACFLT, N5A, "Philippine Withdrawal" Brief, March 1993.
Ikuma, G., Interviews conducted with author between February -
September 1993.
Ikuma, G., "NAS Cubi Point Hot Turnover" Brief, 1992a.
Ikuma, G., "NAS Cubi Point Turnover Contingency" Brief, 1992b.
Mercer, T., Excerpt from an unpublished manuscript, "Farewell
to Subic", 1993a.
Mercer, T., Interview with author, 1993b.
NAS Cubi Point Equipment Transition Plan, August 1992.
Steckler, L., MS Thesis, December 1992.
Wood, B., "NAS Cubi Point Closure," Message, 240634NOV92.
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